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Abstract
After the development of a self-consistent quantum formalism nearly a century
ago there began a quest for how to interpret the theoretical constructs of the for-
malism. In fact, the pursuit of new interpretations of quantum mechanics persists
to this day. Most of these endeavors assume the validity of standard quantum for-
malism and proceed to ponder the ontic nature of wave functions, operators, and
the Scho¨dinger equation. The present essay takes a different approach, more episte-
mological than ontological. I endeavor to give a heuristic account of how empirical
principles lead us to a quantum mechanical description of the world. An outcome
of this approach is the suggestion that the notion of discrete quanta leads to the
wave nature and statistical behavior of matter rather than the other way around.
Finally, the hope is to offer some solace to those older of us who still worry about
such things and also to provide the neophyte student of quantum mechanics with
physical insight into the mathematically abstract and often baffling aspects of the
theory.
Keywords: Quantum theory · Canonical quantization · Foundations of quantum me-
chanics · Measurement problem
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21 Introduction
From the very beginnings of quantum mechanics a century ago, it was clear that the con-
cepts of classical physics were insufficient for describing many phenomena. In particular,
the fact that electrons and light exhibited both the properties of particles and the proper-
ties of waves was anathema to classical physics. After the development of a self-consistent
quantum formalism, there began a quest for just how to interpret the new theoretical con-
structs. De Broglie and Schro¨dinger favored interpreting quantum waves as depicting a
continuous distributions of matter while Einstein and Born suggested that they only pro-
vide a statistical measure of where a particle of matter or radiation might be. After 1930,
the Copenhagen interpretation of Bohr and Heisenberg was generally accepted; although,
Bohr and Heisenberg often emphasized different aspects of the interpretation and there
has never been complete agreement as to its meaning even among its proponents[1]. The
Copenhagen interpretation dealt with the incongruous dual wave and particle properties
by embracing Bohr’s principle of complementarity in which complementary features of
physical systems can only be accessed by experiments designed to observe one or the
other but not both of these features. For example, one can observe either the particle be-
havior or wave behavior of electrons but not both at the same time. In addition, the waves
implicit in Schro¨dinger’s equation were interpreted as probability amplitudes for the out-
comes of experiments. Finally, in order to facilitate the communication of experimental
results, the Copenhagen interpretation emphasized that the description of experiments,
which invariably involve macroscopic apparatus, must be described in classical terms.
These aspects of quantum theory are familiar to all beginning students of quantum
mechanics; however, many students harbor the uneasy feeling that something is missing.
How can an electron in some circumstances exhibit the properties of a particle and at other
times exhibit the properties of a wave? How is it that a primary theoretical constructs
of quantum mechanics, the Schro¨dinger wave functions or Hilbert state vectors, only
indicate the probability of events? Quantum mechanics itself does not seem to indicate
that any event actually happens. Why is it that experiments are only to be described
classically? Where is the quantum/classical divide between the quantum system and the
classical measurement and what governs interactions across this divide? In fact, these
sorts of questions are raised not only by neophyte students of quantum mechanics but
also by seasoned practitioners. In actuality, the question of how to interpret quantum
theory has never been fully answered and new points of view are still being offered. Many
3of these interpretations involve novel mathematical formalisms that have proved to be
useful additions to quantum theory. In fact, new formulations of quantum mechanics
and quantum field theory, including axiomatic approaches, are often accompanied by
new or modified interpretations. Such interpretive analyses are largely framed within the
mathematical formalism of quantum theory and I will refrain from saying anything more
about them.
The purpose of this essay is to address a different, more epistemological question,
“What is it about the physical world that leads us to a quantum theoretic model of it?”
The intention is to in no way malign the more formal investigations of quantum mechan-
ics. Such investigations have been extremely successful in furthering our understanding
of quantum theory as well as increasing our ability to predict and make use of novel quan-
tum phenomena. These treatments invariably begin with the assumption that standard
quantum mechanics is a fundamental law of nature and then proceed with interpreting its
consequences. In this essay I take the point of view that quantum mechanics is a model, a
human invention, created to help us describe and understand our world and then proceed
to address the more philosophical question posed above, a question that is still pondered
by some physicists and philosophers and certainly by many physics students when they
first encounter quantum mechanics. Most of the latter group eventually come to some
understanding, perhaps via the ubiquitous Copenhagen Interpretation, and then proceed
according to the maxim “Shut up and calculate!”1 One modest aim of this essay is to pro-
vide such students with a heuristic perspective on quantum mechanics that might enable
them to proceed to calculations without first having to “shut up”.
2 What’s Quantized?
Let us begin by asking where the ‘quantum’ in quantum mechanics comes from. What is it
that’s quantized? That matter is composed of discrete quanta, atoms, was contemplated
by Greek philosophers in the 5th century B.C.[3] and the idea continued to be espoused
through the 18th century. Even though it wasn’t until the 19th and early 20th centuries that
the existence of atoms was placed on a firm empirical basis, it’s not difficult to imagine
what led early philosophers to an atomistic model. Perhaps the primary motivation,
an argument that still resonates today, was to address the puzzle of change, i.e., the
1The full David Mermin quote is “If I were forced to sum up in one sentence what the Copenhagen
interpretation says to me, it would be ‘Shut up and calculate!’”[2]
4transformation of matter. This was often expressed by the assertion that things cannot
come from nothing nor can they ever return to nothing. Rather, creation, destruction,
and change are most simply explained by the rearrangement of the atomic constituents
of matter. In his epic poem De rerum natura (On the Nature of Things, circa 55 BC),
Lucretius2 explained (translation by R. Melville[4])
...no single thing returns to nothing but at its dissolution everything returns to
matter’s primal particles...they must for sure consist of changeless matter. For
if the primal atoms could suffer change...then no more would certainty exist
of what can be and what cannot...Nor could so oft the race of men repeat the
nature, manners, habits of their parents.
While it took nearly 2500 years, the conjectures of the atomists were largely justified.
One might also reasonably ask, “Are there other aspects of nature that are quantized?”
It’s no coincidence that during the same period that saw the confirmation of the atomic
hypothesis, there appeared evidence for the discrete nature of atomic interactions. Per-
haps the first clues were the early 19th century observations by Wollaston and Fraunhofer
of discrete absorption lines in the spectrum of the sun and the subsequent identification
of emission lines in the spectra of elements in the laboratory by Kirchoff and Bunsen in
1859. In 1888, Rydberg was able to relate the wavelengths of these discrete spectral lines
to ratios of integers. Boltzmann introduced discrete energy as early as 1868 but only
as a computational device in statistical mechanics. It was in 1900 that Planck found he
must take such quantization more seriously in his derivation of the Planck black body
formula[5]. A decade later Jeans, Poincare´, and Ehrenfest demonstrated that the dis-
creteness of energy states, which source black body radiation, follows from the general
morphology of the spectrum and is not the consequence of precisely fitting the observed
spectral data[6]. In 1905 Einstein introduced the notion of quanta of light with energies
that depended on frequency with precisely the same relation as introduced by Planck3,
E = hν, and then used this relation to explain qualitative observations of the photoelec-
tric effect4. In 1907 it was again Einstein who demonstrated that energy quantization of
2Lucretius was a disciple of the Greek atomist Epicurus and his predecessors Democritus and
Leucippus[3].
3It is interesting that in 1899, the year before his seminal Planck’s Law paper, Planck introduced the
constant that bears his name (although he gave it the symbol b) from Paschen’s fit of spectral data to
Wien’s Law. Even then he identified it as a fundamental constant of nature along side e, c, and G.[7]
4Einstein’s quantitative prediction was confirmed by the 1914 experiments of Robert Millikan.
5harmonic oscillators explained why the heat capacities of solids decrease at low tempera-
tures. Finally, Bohr’s 1913 model of discrete energy levels of electrons in atoms explained
the spectral lines of Kirchoff and Bunsen as well as resolved the conflict of Maxwell’s
electrodynamics with the stability of Rutherford’s 1911 nuclear atomic model.
In a 1922 conversation with Heisenberg[8], Bohr expressed an argument for the dis-
creteness of atomic interactions that harkened back to the ancient Greeks’ arguments for
atoms (and to the Lucretius quote above). Bohr based his argument on the stability of
matter, but not in the sense just mentioned. Bohr explained,
By ‘stability’ I mean that the same substances always have the same proper-
ties, that the same crystals recur, the same chemical compounds, etc. In other
words, even after a host of changes due to external influences, an iron atom
will always remain an iron atom, with exactly the same properties as before.
This cannot be explained by the principles of classical mechanics...according
to which all effects have precisely determined causes, and according to which
the present state of a phenomenon or process is fully determined by the one
that immediately preceded it.
In other words, in a world composed of Rutherford atoms, quantum discreteness is nec-
essary in order to preserve the simplicity and regularity of nature. Bohr’s ‘stability’ and
Lucretius’s ‘repeatability’ clearly refer to the same aspect of nature.
It might appear from the examples given above that energy is the key dynamical
quantity that must always come in discrete quanta. However, there are problems with
this demand. For one thing, there is no fundamental constant in physics, such as the speed
of light c, the charge on the electron e, Planck’s constant h, or Newton’s constant G, that
has the units of energy.5 In addition, it’s straightforward to demonstrate that energy is
not quantized in all situations. Suppose there were a fundamental quantum of energy
ε0 and that a free point particle already in motion acquires this much additional kinetic
energy through some unspecified interaction. When viewed by an observer that is initially
co-moving with the particle, it is trivial to demonstrate that the change in its kinetic
energy is significantly less than ε0, thereby violating the hypothetical energy quantization
condition. Similar arguments show that a fundamental quantum of linear momentum is
also excluded. In fact, it’s easy to think of interactions in which the energy and momentum
5To be sure, the Planck energy
√
~c5
G is fundamental but is much too large (2 × 109 Joules) to be
relevant on atomic scales.
6change by arbitrarily small increments. Rutherford scattering and Compton scattering
are two such examples. Finally, we know from quantum theory that a free particle may
assume any of a continuum of values of energy and momentum.
Angular momentum is another example of a dynamical quantity that might come in
discrete quanta and it has the same units as h. In the context of standard quantum
mechanics, the quantum state of a particle can always be expressed as a linear combi-
nation of angular momentum eigenfunctions with eigenvalues that are discrete multiples
of h/2pi. Furthermore, according to the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics,
any measurement of the angular momentum of a system must be an eigenvalue of the
angular momentum operator. This might lead one to conclude that angular momentum
somehow characterizes the quantum nature of interactions. On the other hand, that
such a specific quantity as angular momentum should occupy this primal status seems
doubtful. In addition, a procedure for how to effect a measurement corresponding to
the angular momentum operator is not necessarily well-defined. For example, as far as I
know, there is no unique prescription for how to measure the angular momentum of a free
particle. One can easily conjure a sensible measurement that, depending on the chosen
origin of the coordinate system, results in an arbitrary value of the angular momentum.6
Finally, I remind the reader that it is not the intent of the current discussion to offer an
interpretation of standard quantum mechanics but rather to understand why we are led
to a quantum mechanical model of nature. It is in this context that the semi-classical
arguments excluding energy, momentum, and angular momentum have merit.
To be sure, there are many instances of the quantization of energy E, momentum p,
angular momentum L, and even position x; however, the values of these quanta depend
on the specifics of the system and have a wide range of values. For example, the energy
and momentum in a monochromatic beam of photons are quantized in units of hν and
hν/c but the values of these quanta depend on the frequency of the photons and are
unconstrained; they can take on any value between 0 and ∞, which again argues against
their primal status. An alternate approach might be to consider the quantization of some
specific combination of E, p, L, and x. In fact, Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relation[10],
δxδp ∼ h, points to the product of position and momentum as such a combination (and
we will see that this is, indeed, the case). It might seem inappropriate to invoke a result of
6In fact, sensible measurements can always be found that seemingly violate the quantum hypothe-
sis as well as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle; however, these invariably involve the inappropriate
application of quantum mechanics. Dyson [9] has given several examples of such measurements.
7quantum mechanics in the current epistemological approach; however, Heisenberg arrived
at this relation, not from quantum mechanics, but rather from an empirical gedanken
experiment involving a gamma ray microscope as will be discussed later.
In 1912, Nicholson proposed that the angular momentum of an electron in orbit about
an atomic nucleus is quantized and the following year Ehrenfest argued that the unit of
this quantum is ~ ≡ h/2pi. In the same year, Bohr incorporated these ideas into his model
of an atom, a model that provided a successful explanation of the spectrum of atomic hy-
drogen. Even though ~ has the same units as angular momentum, we argued above that
it is doubtful that angular momentum constitutes the fundamental quantum interaction.
Wilson, Ishiwara, Epstein, and Sommerfeld soon replaced Nicholoson/Ehrenfest/Bohr
quantization with the notion that Hamilton-Jacobi action variables Jk (for periodic sys-
tems), which also have the same units as h, are quantized[11]. That is, Jk ≡
∮
pkdxk = nh
where pk is the momentum conjugate to the coordinate xk, n is an integer, and the integral
is taken over one cycle of periodic motion. Recall that one rationale for excluding energy,
momentum, and angular momentum as fundamental quanta is that such quantization is
not necessarily independent of the frame of reference. It is straightforward to demonstrate
that the action integral is the same for all non-relativistic inertial observers, i.e., v  c,
(up to an additive constant that is irrelevant for the physics of the systems)7. What other
properties of action variables might single them out as amenable to quantization?
In 1846, the French astronomer Delaunay invented a method of solving a certain
class of separable8 dynamical problems for which the action variables Jk are constants of
the motion[15]. In 1916, Ehrenfest added to the primacy of action variables by point-
ing out that all of these quantities that had been previously quantized were adiabatic
invariants[11]. That is, they remain constant during adiabatic changes of the parameters
that define a system. This implies, for example, that if one slowly changes the length
of a pendulum, it will remain in the same quantum state. This requirement is desir-
able; otherwise, such an adiabatic perturbation is apt to leave the system in a state that
is not consistent with the quantization condition for the changed system. On the other
hand, the quantization of action depends on the coordinates employed, which again seems
7The relativistic case is much more complicated[12]; however, even then there are individual cases in
which action angle variables are Lorentz invariant[13]. Fock[14] demonstrated that the geodesic equation
of general relativity can be expressed in terms of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation and action function S.
8Separable refers to problems for which Hamilton’s principle function S can be written as a sum of
functions, each depending on a single generalized coordinate, i.e., S =
∑
Sk(qk).
8unacceptable for a fundamental principle.
It was Einstein who in 1917 gave a new interpretation of the quantization conditions by
demonstrating that they followed from the requirement that Hamilton’s principle function
S is multivalued such that the change in S around any closed curve in configuration space
is an integer times Planck’s constant, i.e.,
∮
pkdqk =
∮
∂S
∂qk
dqk =
∮
dS = nh[16]. This
geometric expression no longer depends on the choice of coordinates. Consider the case
of a one-dimensional harmonic oscillator such that
∮
pdx =
∮
px˙dt =
∮
2Kdt = 2〈K〉τ =
Eτ = nh where 〈K〉 is the average kinetic energy, E is the total energy, and τ is the
period of the oscillator. Then ∆E = h/τ = hν, Planck’s ansatz for the quantization of
the energy exchanged between blackbody radiation and hypothetical harmonic oscillators
of frequency ν = 1/τ embedded in the walls of a blackbody cavity. For the case of an
electromagnetic wave of wavelength λ and frequency ν = c/λ, the quantization condition
becomes
∮
pdx = pλ = pc/ν = nh. The energy and momentum of an electromagnetic
wave are related by E = pc, therefore, E = nhν, Einstein’s relation for photons, the
quanta of electromagnetic radiation. The same quantization rule applies to the angular
momentum pφ of an electron in a hydrogen atom,
∮
pφdφ = 2pipφ = nh ⇒ pφ = n~, the
Nicholoson/Ehrenfest/Bohr quantization condition.
Disclaimer: The quantization conditions of Hamilton-Jacobi action were part of the
foundations of the old quantum theory from the years 1900-1925 and have long since been
superseded by the formalism of modern quantum mechanics and quantum field theory.9 In
addition, the quantization procedure fails for non-integrable (chaotic) systems.10 Finally,
the above arguments are semi-classical and, as such, it’s difficult to imagine how they
can provide a firm foundation for modern quantum theory. However, the reader should
be reminded that the purpose of this essay is not an axiomatic derivation of quantum
mechanics from fundamental principles but rather to acquire insight into the quantum
world and thus address the question, “What is it about the physical world that led us to
a quantum theoretic model of it?” I now continue with this task.
9Although, it is possible to derive a similar set of quantization conditions from today’s quantum
mechanics, i.e.,
∮ ∑
pkdqk = (n+m/4)h, where n is an arbitrary integer and m is an integer related to
the caustic structure of S.[16, 17]
10Einstein already indicated such a problem in 1917 but it wasn’t until years later that its significance
to quantum mechanics, in the context of quantum chaos, was realized. Gutzwiller later demonstrated
that despite the absence of a canonical quantization scheme for such cases “strong classical-quantum
correspondences exist even for chaotic systems.”[16]
93 Quantization and Waves
In 1923 Duane[19], Breit[20], and Compton[21] applied the quantization condition to
the interaction of x-ray photons with an infinite, periodic crystal lattice and were able
to obtain Bragg’s law of reflection without directly invoking the wave nature of x-rays.
A somewhat simpler case is that of photons incident on an infinite diffraction grating.
Figure 1 is a replica of the schematic diagram in Breit’s 1923 paper where hν/c = pγ is
the momentum of the incident photon, G is the diffraction grating, D0, D±1, D±2, ... are
the positions of the slits of the grating, θ is the scattering angle, and P is the transverse
momentum of the emergent photon. Now assume that the momentum transferred from the
radiation to the grating is governed by
∮
pdx = nh where p is in a direction parallel to its
Figure 1: Photon scattered from an infinite diffraction grating from Breit[20]
surface and the integral is taken over the transverse distance necessary to bring the system
back to its original condition, i.e., the line spacing d = Dk+1−Dk. In this case, the average
momentum transferred to the grating is 〈p〉 = ∮ pdx/ ∮ dx = nh/d and by conservation
of momentum this must also be the magnitude of the transverse momentum transferred
to an incident photon, i.e., P = 〈p〉. If photons are incident perpendicular to the plane
of the grating, then the allowed angles at which they are transmitted through the grating
are given by sin θn = 〈p〉/pγ.11 Thus, sin θn = nh/pγd, which is the relation for diffraction
11Because the mass of the grating is very large, the momentum and energy of the scattered photon,
pγ and pγc, do not change, a result that follows from the Compton effect discovered only a few months
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(interference) of a wave with wavelength λ = h/pγ. Again, no specific reference to the
wave nature of the photons is necessary. Breit[20] and Epstein & Ehrenfest[22] extended
these results to finite width, single and multiple slit interference patterns. Thus, the
quantization condition
∮
pdx = nh leads directly to the interference properties of photons
without directly invoking their wave nature. It is curious that none of these authors
extended their analyses to the case of electrons scattered from crystals, a process that
should obey the same quantization condition. If they had, they might have predicted that
λ = h/p and the wave nature of electrons prior to de Broglie’s 1924 thesis and Davisson
& Germer’s and Thomson’s 1927 electron diffraction experiments. The analyses of Duane
et al. provide seminal illustrations of a direct path from the quantization of action to the
wave behavior of particles and photons. As such, they lend credence to the notion that
there is a primal relation between the quantization of dynamical properties and the dual
wave-particle behavior of quantum systems.
4 Physics and Probability
Another major conundrum of quantum mechanics is the fundamental role of probability in
the theory.12 The probabilities are taken to apply to the outcomes of possible observations
of a system even though some of the observations are mutually exclusive (Bohr’s principle
of complementarity). This seems to fly in the face of our classical notion that physical
systems should be completely describable in isolation, prior to and independent of any
observation. How is it that the specification of mere probabilities can possibly constitute
a fundamental description of a physical system and if so, how can such a description
possibly provide a complete description of reality?13
In 1927 Heisenberg proposed the indeterminacy relation, δxδp ∼ h, that bears his
name. It was his contention that “this indeterminacy is the real basis for the occurrence of
statistical relations in quantum mechanics.”[10] He arrived at the concept by considering
a gedanken experiment in the form of a gamma ray microscope. Heisenberg reasoned
that with such a microscope one could only determine an electron’s position to within
earlier.
12It was Einstein who first suggested that the intensity of electromagnetic waves was a measure of the
probability of the location of photons. Born extended this notion to particles with a similar interpretation
of the wave functions of Schro¨dinger’s equation.[18]
13In fact, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen[23] maintained “that the description of reality as given by a
[quantum] wave function is not complete.”
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on the order of one gamma ray wavelength, δx ∼ λ. But in doing so, one would impart
to the electron an unknown momentum on the order of the momentum of the incident
gamma ray, δp ∼ Eγ/c = hν/c = h/λ, and hence, δxδp ∼ h.14 To the extent that
the wave behavior of gamma rays follows from quantization, as demonstrated by Duane
et al., the Heisenberg indeterminacy relation is a direct consequence of the quantum of
action. Heisenberg also demonstrated that this relation can be determined directly from
the formalism of quantum mechanics; however, our point here is that it is already evident
from the quantization of action.
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is one of the pillars of modern physics and his
gamma ray microscope provides a particularly intuitive interpretation of the principle.
However, there are other insightful gendanken experiments that are more directly tied to
quantization. For example, suppose a particle is confined to be within a one-dimensional
box (potential well) of width ` but is otherwise free, i.e., has constant momentum p along
the one dimension but in either direction. The motion of the particle will clearly be
periodic with a spatial period 2` and the quantization condition is
∮
pdx = 2p` = nh. If
the particle is in its ground state, n = 1 and 2p` = h. At any instant, the uncertainty
in the particle’s position is clearly δx ∼ `. The magnitude of the particle’s momentum
is known but it could be moving in either direction so the uncertainty in its momentum
is δp ∼ h/`. Combining these two relations, we arrive at Heisenberg’s indeterminacy
relation, δxδp ∼ h. Of course, this particle is confined; however, if the box is opened,
the particle is free to move in either direction. Immediately after the box is opened, the
uncertainties in the position and momentum of the now free particle again satisfy the
Heisenberg relation, δxδp ∼ h.
The argument that Heisenberg gave to support his contention that the uncertainty
relations are the basis for the statistical relations in quantum mechanics is as follows,[10]
We have not assumed that quantum theory–in opposition to classical theory–is
an essentially statistical theory in the sense that only statisitical conclusions
can be drawn from precise statistical data....Rather, in all cases in which
relations exist in classical theory between quantities which are really exactly
measurable, the corresponding exact relations also hold in quantum theory
(laws of conservation of momentum and energy). But what is wrong in the
sharp formulation of the law of causality, “When we know the present precisely,
14Heisenberg also argued that similar indeterminacy relations occurred for all conjugate pairs of ob-
servable quantities.
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we can predict the future,” is not the conclusion but the assumption. Even in
principle we cannot know the present in all detail. For that reason everything
observed is a slection from a plenitude of possibilities and a limitation on what
is possible in the future.
Another reason to concede to a statistical view of nature is the realization that this
notion is not particularly foreign to classical physics. Certainly, statistical mechanics is
one of the triumphal successes of classical physics. On the experimental side, careful
consideration of uncertainties is always essential when comparing observations with the-
oretical predictions, either quantum or classical. In the classical case these uncertainties
are usually viewed as experimental “noise” and left to the experimentalist to elucidate.
However, this doesn’t necessarily have to be the case. The Hamilton-Jacobi formalism
provides an approach in which such uncertainties can be included in the fundamental
equations of classical mechanics[24, 25]; although, it is usually far more convenient to
deal with them in the analysis of a measurement rather than as fundamental facet of
the theory.15 An interesting aside is that by combining the statistical Hamilton-Jacobi
formalism of classical mechanics with the Heisenberg uncertainty relations, one can gen-
erate a plausible route to Schro¨dinger’s equation and the concomitant wave nature of
particles[26, 27]. One can even construe statistical relations in classical physics in terms
of classical indeterminacy relations δx > 0 and δp > 0[28]. In a very real sense, violations
of these relations, namely δx = 0 or δp = 0, are just as inaccessible as a violation of
the quantum mechanical uncertainty principle, δxδp < ~/2, an assertion to which any
experimentalist will attest.16 These arguments are certainly not intended to demonstrate
that quantum mechanics and classical mechanics are compatible. Clearly, they are not.
They are offered simply to emphasize that probability and statistics are fundamental to
physics, both classical and quantum. Rather, the crucial difference between the two is the
quantization of action that is primal in quantum physics but absent in classical physics.
15In fact, some experimental uncertainties are routinely included in quantum mechanical calculations
expressed as the weightings in mixed states.
16Note that here I’ve replaced Heiseberg’s δxδp ∼ h with the usual δxδp ≥ ~/2, which is derived from
the corresponding quantum mechanical commutation relation.
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5 The Quantum/Classical Divide
The dual wave-particle nature of matter and radiation and the probabilistic nature of the
theory are not the only elements that exasperate beginning students of quantum mechan-
ics. Another point of discomfort is the quantum/classical divide that the Copenhagen
interpretation places between a quantum system and a classical measuring apparatus.
Where is the divide and what physical interactions occur at the divide? This dilemma is
predicated upon the supposition that experiments must be, or inevitably are, described by
classical physics. Upon closer inspection, the assertion that classical physics adequately
describes experiments is far from obvious. Bohr expressed the situation as follows[29]:
The decisive point is to recognize that the description of the experimental ar-
rangement and the recordings of observations must be given in plain language,
suitably refined by the usual terminology. This is a simple logical demand,
since by the word ‘experiment’ we can only mean a procedure regarding which
we are able to communicate to others what we have done and what we have
learnt.
Stapp[1] chose to emphasize this pragmatic view of classicality by using the word specifi-
cations, i.e.,
Specifications are what architects and builders, and mechanics and machinists,
use to communicate to one another conditions on the concrete social realities
or actualities that bind their lives together. It is hard to think of a theo-
retical concept that could have a more objective meaning. Specifications are
described in technical jargon that is an extension of everyday language. This
language may incorporate concepts from classical physics. But this fact in no
way implies that these concepts are valid beyond the realm in which they are
used by technicians.
The point is that descriptions of experiments are invariably given in terms of operational
prescriptions or specifications that can be communicated to technicians, engineers, and
the physics community at large. The formalism of quantum mechanics has absolutely
nothing to say about experiments.
There have been many proposed theoretical resolutions to the problem of the quan-
tum/classical divide but none of them seem adequate (e.g., [30]). One obvious approach
14
is simply to treat the measuring apparatus as a quantum mechanical system. While per-
haps impractical, no one doubts that quantum mechanics applies to the bulk properties
of matter and so this path might, in principle, seem reasonable. However to the extent
that it can be accomplished, the apparatus becomes part of the (probabilistic) quantum
mechanical system for which yet another measuring apparatus is required to observe the
combined system. Heisenberg expressed this in the extreme case, “One may treat the
whole world as one mechanical system, but then only a mathematical problem remains
while access to observation is closed off.”[31]
Ultimately, the dilemma of the quantum/classical divide or rather system/experiment
divide is a faux problem. Precisely the same situation occurs in classical physics but
apparently has not been considered problematic. Are the operational prescriptions of
experiments part and parcel of classical theory? Are they couched in terms of point
particles, rigid solid bodies, Newton’s laws or Hamilton-Jacobi theory? Of course not.
They are part of Bohr’s “procedure regarding which we are able to communicate to others
what we have done and what we have learnt.” Therefore, it seems that the problem of
the relation of theory and measurement didn’t arise with quantum mechanics but exists
in classical mechanics as well. At a 1962 conference on the foundations of quantum
mechanics, Wendell Furry explained[32]
So that in quantum theory we have something not really worse than we had
in classical theory. In both theories you don’t say what you do when you
make a measurement, what the process is. But in quantum theory we have
our attention focused on this situation. And we do become uncomfortable
about it, because we have to talk about the effects of the measurement on the
systems....I am asking for something that the formalism doesn’t contain, finally
when you describe a measurement. Now, classical theory doesn’t contain any
description of measurement. It doesn’t contain anywhere near as much theory
of measurement as we have here [in quantum mechanics]. There is a gap in
the quantum mechanical theory of measurement. In classical theory there is
practically no theory of measurement at all, as far as I know.
At that same conference Eugene Wigner put it like this [33]
Now, how does the experimentalist know that this apparatus will measure for
him the position? “Oh”, you say, “he observed that apparatus. He looked
at it.” Well that means that he carried out a measurement on it. How did
15
he know that the apparatus with which he carried out that measurement will
tell him the properties of the apparatus? Fundamentally, this is again a chain
which has no beginning. And at the end we have to say, “We learned that
as children how to judge what is around us.” And there is no way to do
this scientifically. The fact that in quantum mechanics we try to analyze the
measurement process only brought this home to us that much sharply.
Because physicists have long since become comfortable with the relation between theory
and measurement in classical physics, perhaps the quantum case shouldn’t be viewed as
particularly problematic.
6 Back to Quanta
I began this essay with the question “What is it about the physical world around us that
leads us to a quantum theoretic model of it?” and have tried to answer it by discussing
the quantal character of the physical world along with the inevitability of the statistical
nature of both quantum and classical physics. In addition, when compared with its
classical counterpart, the relation of theory and measurement in quantum mechanics
doesn’t seem all that unusual. I hope these musings will provide some comfort to beginning
students of quantum mechanics by providing at least a heuristic answer that bears on the
epistemological origin of the dual wave-particle nature, the probabilistic interpretation
of the quantum formalism, and the somewhat elusive connection of theoretical formalism
and measurements. Perhaps they will be afforded some solace as their credulity is strained
by references to wave-particle duality, the collapse of the wave function, and the spooky
action at a distance of entangled quantum systems. I personally suspect that the quagmire
to which we are led by these issues is spawned by conflating the physical world with the
mathematical formalism that is intended only to model it, but this is a topic for another
conversation.
The purpose of this essay is neither to demystify quantum mechanics nor to stifle
conversation about its interpretation. To be sure, the number of extraordinary quantum
phenomena seems to be nearly without limit. Quantum spin, anti-matter, field theory,
gauge symmetry, the standard model of elementary particles, etc., are all subsequent
developments in quantum theory that have very little connection to classical physics and
about which the above discussion has little to say. Certainly wave-particle duality is a
mysterious fact of nature. Whether one considers it to be a fundamental principle, as did
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Bohr, or sees it as intimately related to the quantal character of the world is, perhaps, a
matter of taste. I have sought to couch the discussion not in the mathematical formalism
of quantum theory, but in terms of a simple physical principle: Matter, radiation, and
their interactions occur only in discreet quanta. Rather than quashing discussion of the
meaning of quantum mechanics, perhaps this essay will stimulate new discussions.
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